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Abstract 
 
We explore strategic trade in short-lived securities by agents who possess long-term information. Trading 
short-lived securities is profitable only if enough of the private information becomes public prior to 
contract expiration; otherwise the security will worthlessly expire. We highlight how this results in 
trading behavior fundamentally different from that observed in standard models of informed trading in 
equity. Specifically, we show that informed agents are more reluctant to trade shorter-term securities too 
far in advance of when their information will necessarily be made public, and that existing positions in a 
shorter-term security make future purchases more attractive. Because informed agents prefer longer-term 
securities, this can make trading shorter-term contracts more attractive for liquidity traders. We 
characterize the conditions under which liquidity traders choose to incur extra costs to roll over short-term 
positions rather than trade in distant contracts, providing an explanation for why most longer-term 
derivative security markets have little liquidity and large bid-ask spreads. 
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We explore strategic trade in short-lived securities by an “informed agent” who possesses long-term private
information. From the informed agent’s perspective, the risk associated with trading short-lived securities
is that his position will be proﬁtable only if his private information is revealed publicly (and is reﬂected in
prices) prior to contract expiration. As time passes, newly-issued contracts with later expiration dates be-
come available for purchase. We model the informed agent’s decision regarding when, and how frequently,
to purchase these contracts.
When an informed agent purchases a short-term security, he conveys information to the market even if
the contract does not pay off, adversely affecting future contract prices. These strategic information costs
are higher for short-term securities than for equity, and more generally for nearby contracts than distant
contracts. This is because, in contrast to trading equity, where an informed agent will ultimately beneﬁt from
his trades, trading short-term securities is proﬁtable only if the private information is impounded in the price
before expiry. Ignoring leverage concerns, this makes an informed agent more reluctant to trade immediately
in shorter-term securities. Indeed, even if it is proﬁtable in expectation to trade now, an informed agent may
prefer to defer in the hope of obtaining better prices in the future. The attendant risk with this strategy is
that his information may be revealed publicly before he can exploit it.
In further contrast to equity, a risk neutral informed agent’s holding of a short-lived security affects his
trading behavior: Higher past informed trading leads to greater future informed trading. As the informed
agent’s holdings of the short-lived security increase, the less he minds if his subsequent trading reveals his
information, since he will proﬁt from his existing stake. In contrast, equity holdings do not affect his trading
strategy in the same manner, since he will eventually proﬁt on his existing stake, provided he does not close
his position. So, too, the time-to-expiry of the short-lived affects trading intensities. We show that informed
trading intensities rise as the time-to-expiry approaches, so that prices become more sensitive to order ﬂow.
Our model also provides insights into a puzzling empirical feature of derivative security markets —
despite the existence of a widespread desire to hedge against long-term risk, longer-term option and futures
contracts have little liquidity and large spreads. For example, Fleming and Sarkar (1999) found that 90% of
totaltradingvolumeinTreasuryFuturesin1993occurredinthenearbycontract(thecontractwithexpiration
1month closest to the trading date), and that distant contracts generally had far lower trading volumes and
larger realized spreads. Comparable rises in open interest and volume as time-to-maturity falls are found in
commodity-based futures contracts and other derivative security contracts, (e.g. longer-term options such as
LEAPs (Long-term Equity AnticiPation Securities)).
Heuristic industry evidence suggests that the strategy of sequentially rolling over nearby futures con-
tracts is quite common. Rolling over shorter-term positions, often referred to as “rolling the hedge,” has an
additional cost over buying longer-term contracts — each time a position is rolled over, transactions costs
(commissions, bid-ask spread) must be incurred. This paper details conditions under which liquidity traders
chose to incur extra costs to roll over their short-term positions, rather than trade distant option and futures
contracts. The intuition is that informed agents place a greater value on distant contracts because their in-
formation is more likely to be revealed before the contract expires, while liquidity traders value only the
reduced roll-over costs. Provided ﬁxed trading costs are small, the greater adverse selection costs in distant
contracts more than offset the increased ﬁxed trading costs, so that long-term liquidity traders prefer to trade
nearby contracts. If all liquidity traders prefer the nearby contract, informed agents must also trade it.
Our model captures a variety of situations in which informed agents, with trading horizons extending
beyond the date when their information will become public, trade in markets where they have to realize their
position before this date. For example, our model captures an agent attempting to leverage up his capital
by trading in options. Alternatively, our model captures futures trading in commodity markets, where an
informed agent cannot readily take a position by purchasing the commodity (e.g. soybeans) and where
futures contracts with longer time horizons either do not exist or have poor liquidity. So, too, our analysis is
relevant for informed agents who want to short-sell and face margin requirements. If an informed agent has
limited resources, and the price moves against him, he may have to close his position before his information
is incorporated into price.
Related Literature: Our model shares features of the overlapping generations model proposed by
Dow and Gorton (1994). Dow and Gorton endogenize the choice to act on private information made by in-
formed agents with short-horizons and one trading opportunity. In their model, information is only revealed
through trade. Hence, an informed agent trades only if he believes it sufﬁciently likely that a future informed
agent will trade before he has to realize his position, so that prices will reﬂect his information. Because Dow
2and Gorton allow an informed agent only one opportunity to trade, their model does not capture the essence
of repeatedly trading short-lived securities when informed agents have long-term intrinsic private informa-
tion. In particular, their informed agents do not internalize the effects of current trade on future trading
opportunities, so that immediate trade is more attractive and private information becomes public sooner.
In contrast to the Dow and Gorton model, we consider a single informed agent contemplating purchases
of a series of short-lived securities. We show that the informed agent’s trading decisions and proﬁt depend
subtly on both the likelihood of liquidity trade and how far the market maker’s competitive price is expected
to diverge from its ‘fundamental’ value. We then extend the model to consider how the informed agent’s
strategy depends on his accumulated position and the availability of contracts of different durations.
In another model with short trading horizons, De Long et al. (1990) offer a rationale for why risk averse
arbitrageurs may have a limited willingness to bet against noise traders: a concern that noise trader beliefs
may not revert to the true value for a long time. Even if there is no ‘fundamental’ risk associated with
purchasing ‘under-priced’ stocks, ‘arbitrage’ may be imperfect because of this ‘noise trader’ risk.
Back (1993) integrates a long-lived call option into a continuous time Kyle (1985) model. Back shows
that if trades to the option and the underlying asset convey different information, then the option cannot be
spanned by the underlying asset (i.e. it is not redundant) and thus cannot be priced by arbitrage arguments.
Indeed, the empirical observations that long-dated contracts typically have little volume and large bid-ask
spreads can only be reconciled by the presence of market microstructure effects.
Unfortunately, one cannot modify Back’s model of a long-lived option to explain these empirical regu-
larities and capture the strategic impacts of trading short-lived securities. Incorporating short-lived securities
immediately entails consideration of how asset holdings affect strategic trading behavior. Also, a signiﬁcant
portion of the strategic tradeoff between long- and short-lived securities for both liquidity and informed
agents concerns the avoidance of ﬁxed trading costs associated with rolling over positions. The requirement
that trade be normally distributed precludes the possibility that a Kyle-style model such as Back’s can cap-
ture the strategic tradeoff between higher ﬁxed trading costs of rolling over shorter-term securities, and their
reduced adverse selection costs.
Other models of informed trade in option markets include Biais and Hillion (1994) and John et al.
(2001). Biais and Hillion consider a static model in which a single trader (either informed or a rational, risk
3averse liquidity trader) chooses whether to trade the stock or the option. Adding the opportunity to trade
options may reduce informed proﬁts because of the effects on liquidity trading strategies. John et al.’s static
model explores how margin requirements affect the choice by informed agents of which asset to trade.
Our model contrasts with models of informed trading in equity (e.g., Kyle (1985), Back et al. (2000),
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1996)) where informed agents have multiple
opportunities to trade a long-lived asset, but do not need to realize positions before their information be-
comes public. The informed agents care about both current and future prices, but because they do not have
to unwind positions there is no penalty to investing early; eventually stock prices reﬂect private information.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the basic model. Section 3 characterizes the
informed agent’s equilibrium trading strategy and details how outcomes vary with the parameters describing
the economy. Section 4 introduces short-lived contracts that exist for longer periods. First, we explore
how the informed agent’s accumulated position affects his trading strategy. An informed agent with an
accumulated position takes into consideration that submitting an order this period increases the probability
that his information will be revealed and that his previously purchased contract will then be exercised at a
proﬁt. Next, we extend the analysis to consider: (i) longer-lived liquidity traders; and (ii) the choice between
trading securities with different holding periods. We characterize how the time until expiry affects trading
behavior, and show that when agents can choose whether to trade long- or short-lived securities, then for
reasonable parameterizations of the economy, only shorter-lived securities are traded. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a multi-period economy with two primitive assets: a riskless asset that returns r = 0, and a risky
asset. At some distant date T, the value of the risky asset will be v 2 fB;Gg, G > B. Ex ante the good
state (v = G) and the bad state (v = B) occur with equal probability. Let i = T ¡ t be the number of
periods remaining until date T: Period i corresponds to the date with i periods remaining until date T.
There are three types of market participants: (1) a risk neutral, competitive market maker; (2) short-lived
liquidity traders who arrive randomly; and (3) an informed agent. With probability ±, an informed agent has
private information about the risky asset: he knows whether the realization was G or B. The true future
4state may be revealed to the public in period i in two ways: either by the equilibrium trading order ﬂow
(in a manner detailed below); or by an information leak, which occurs with probability ¸i.1 As period 0
approaches, the asset’s value is more likely to be revealed to the public, ¸i · ¸i¡1. Let µi 2 fb;n;gg reﬂect
whether bad news (b), no news (n), or good news (g) leaked out at period i.
Market participants can trade a series of one-period European binary call options. The option is available
for purchase at the beginning of each period i at price Po;i and expires at the end of period i for a payoff of
Pc;i. At the beginning of period i, given current and past order ﬂows, the competitive market maker assigns





1 if ¯o;i = 1
¯o;i¸i if ¯o;i < 1.
(1)
At the end of period i, the market maker updates her belief about the good state to ¯c;i to reﬂect the possible
leakage of private information during the period. The payoff at expiration to an option that matures at the
end of period i is:
Pc;i =
(1 if µi = g
0 if µi = n or µi = b.
We focus on binary options for the same reason that Dow and Gorton (1994) consider assets that pay
off zero or one — they reduce algebra and the qualitative predictions extend to more general short-lived
contracts (e.g. standard options, futures contracts). Speciﬁcally, the binary options are in the money if and
only if the private information is revealed before they expire. In this way we capture the essence of trading
short-lived securities written on longer-lived assets, while circumventing the need to model trade in multiple
markets at each date. Section 4 extends the model to allow for multiple securities of different durations, and
the choice of which security to trade.
All agents have a sufﬁcient endowment that they are not wealth constrained in equilibrium. Agents incur
a transaction cost of c ¸ 0 when buying or selling the short-term security. This ﬁxed trading cost represents
brokerage fees plus time costs, etc. Without loss of generality, we assume that agents can only submit orders
in round (integer) lots (this assumption never impacts on equilibrium outcomes).
1An alternative interpretation of our economic environment is that the risky asset pays a dividend of B or G at a random time
between dates t = 0 and t = T. The informed agent knows the dividend realization but not the timing of the dividend payment.
Then ¸i corresponds to the probability the dividend is paid at period i, conditional on the dividend not previously being paid.
5The basic model only considers the “buy” side of the market.2 As a result, the subgame equilibrium
when the bad state occurs just has the informed agent declining to place an order. Since we want to consider
situations where the informed agent may trade, without loss of generality, we focus on the case where the
good state occurs.
It is important to emphasize that we can extend our model to incorporate the “sell” side of the market.
This has a non-trivial effect on outcomes, but not on any of our qualitative ﬁndings. If market participants
could trade on both sides of the market, then for some parameterizations the informed agent might want to
(probabilistically) trade against his information in order to manipulate market maker beliefs. In equilibrium,
however, the market maker accounts for this possibility, revising her beliefs less dramatically in response to
an order ﬂow of two. Allowing for this possibility does not otherwise change the model’s qualitative predic-
tions, but it does complicate informed agent strategies and reduce the clarity with which private information
is revealed through trade. It is for these reasons that we restrict attention to the “buy” side.
Short-lived liquidity traders: Each period i, a short-lived liquidity trader enters the market with probability
0:5 to place a buy order of size one for the short-term security. The liquidity trader is uninformed and trades
only once. With equal probability no short-lived liquidity trader trades in period i. Let Zi 2 f0;1g represent
the short-lived liquidity trader’s period i order. This stark contrast between high noise trading (one order)
andlownoisetrading(noorders)allowsthemodeltocapturesimplythefeaturethatwithpositiveprobability
the market maker will detect the informed agent’s presence.
We assume that the probability of liquidity trade is one-half for the same reasons that Dow and Gorton
(1994) do: it permits us to characterize equilibrium outcomes analytically. For other liquidity trading proba-
bilities, analytical (closed-form) solutions for the equilibrium do not obtain, and numerical characterizations
are required; Bernhardt et al. (2002) provide those characterizations. When the probability of liquidity trade
is one-half, market maker beliefs about the probability of the good state do not change following an order
ﬂow of one: ¯i(¯i+1;Yi = 1) = ¯i+1.
Informed agent: There is at most one privately-informed agent in the market. The informed agent can
trade the short-term security as often as he wishes. Of course, given positive transactions costs, he will not
2Our modeling assumptions can be motivated by Easley et al. (1998). They document empirically that (i) option markets are
a key venue for information-based trading; and (ii) it is important to distinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ news option
volumes.
6trade once his information becomes public. The informed agent and the possible liquidity trader submit their
orders simultaneously. A risk neutral competitive market maker observes the aggregate order ﬂow and sets
a price equal to the conditional expected value of the short-term security given her information.
Sequence of Events: The sequence of events during period i is as follows:
1. The market maker enters with a prior ¯c;i+1 that reﬂects past trade and announcements.
2. The informed agent, having observed past order ﬂows and public announcements, selects a trading
probability. With probability one-half, a liquidity trader also submits an order.
3. The market maker observes total order ﬂow, updates her beliefs to ¯o;i, and sets an opening option
price of Po;i.
4. During the period, the informed agent’s private information may or may not be revealed. This infor-
mation is revealed publicly with probability ¸i.
5. At period’s end, the market maker updates her prior (¯c;i) to reﬂect whether the private information
was revealed publicly.
6. Outstanding options either are exercised or expire. If the good state was revealed, agents can exercise
the options (and receive 1 for each option) or sell them at their closing price, Pc;i = 1. If the good
state was not revealed, the options expire worthlessly, Pc;i = 0.
Equilibrium: The total period i order ﬂow for the short-lived security is Yi = Xi + Zi. Let Hi =
fYT;YT¡1;:::;Yig and Θi = fµT;µT¡1;:::;µig denote respectively, the period i history of past order ﬂows
and past public announcements.
The order submission function, PrfXi = xi j v;Hi+1;Θi+1g, is a period strategy for the informed
agent, mapping the date T asset value and history of order ﬂows and announcements into a probability
distribution over the set of feasible individual orders for the short-lived security for each period i. A period
strategy for the market maker is a pair of pricing functions, Po;i(Hi;Θi+1) and Pc;i(Hi;Θi), for the open
and close of trading respectively, that map the order ﬂow and public announcement histories into prices.
In a sequentially rational (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium: (i) the informed agent’s order submission
strategy maximizes (recursively) lifetime expected proﬁts given correct beliefs about pricing functions; and
7(ii) the pricing function is consistent with the behavior of the informed and earns the market maker zero
expected proﬁts conditional on the order ﬂow.
We solve for the equilibrium recursively. If the total order ﬂow in the market exceeds one or is a non-
integer quantity, the market maker knows that the informed agent traded. Hence, if the informed agent
submits an order, he will try to conceal his trade from the market maker by placing an order for one round
lot: in equilibrium, Xi 2 f0;1g. For simplicity, let Âi = PrfXi = 1g denote the probability that the
informed agent submits an order for one round lot at period i; 1 ¡ Âi is the probability that the informed
agent defers from trading.
Given competitive pricing, in equilibrium, the history of order ﬂow and public announcements through
period i can be summarized by the market maker’s belief at the end of period i that the good state will occur,
¯c;i. Since the informed agent only trades when v = G, the informed agent’s strategy can be summarized
by Âi(¯c;i+1). In equilibrium, the market maker’s pricing strategy at period i can also be summarized by
Po;i(¯c;i+1;Yi) and Pc;i(¯c;i+1;Yi;µi).
We now develop the economy formally. We ﬁrst derive the beliefs the market maker forms about the
probability that the good state will occur. At the beginning of period T, market maker beliefs correspond to
the ex ante probability that the good state occurs: ¯c;T+1 = 0:5. At any period i · T, the market maker
will receive either zero, one or two orders as illustrated in ﬁgure 1. In equilibrium, market maker beliefs
will reﬂect the equilibrium trading probabilities of the informed agent.
A direct application of Bayes’ rule shows that the market maker assigns equilibrium probability
¯o;i(¯c;i+1;Yi) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
[1¡±Âi(¯c;i+1)]¯c;i+1
1¡±Âi(¯c;i+1)¯c;i+1 if Yi = 0
¯c;i+1 if Yi = 1
1 if Yi = 2
(2)
to the good state.3 It is important to emphasize that the updating rules reﬂect the equilibrium outcome
resulting from the consistency of market maker beliefs and the informed agent’s actions. The probability
¯o;i(¯c;i+1;Yi) determines the opening price at which the contract is purchased in period i. The closing
3For example, this reﬂects that there are three possible situations in which no orders will be submitted: (a) with probability,
0:5±(1 ¡ ¯c;i+1), no liquidity trader enters and the informed sees bad news; (b) with probability, 0:5±¯c;i+1[1 ¡ Âi(¯c;i+1)], no
liquidity trader enters and the informed agent receives good news but refrains from trading; and (c) with probability 0:5(1 ¡ ±), no
liquidity trader enters and there is no informed agent.
8price reﬂects whether the true state was revealed publicly. If the information is not revealed, ¯c;i = ¯o;i.
Otherwise, ¯c;i = 1 if the good state is revealed and ¯c;i = 0 if the bad state is revealed. To reduce notation,
in what follows we denote ¯c;i as simply ¯i.
3 Informed Agent’s Problem
By solving the the informed agent’s dynamic programming problem that determines his trading decisions,
we can characterize equilibrium outcomes when we substitute in consistent beliefs of the market maker.
The analysis exploits the fact that prices are higher when the market maker believes the informed agent is
more likely to trade, making trading less attractive. The functional equation governing the informed agent’s







; s.t. Yi = Xi + Zi;
where ¼i are period payoffs and V0(¢) = 0: In equilibrium, the informed agent’s mixed trading strategy
Âi corresponds to the probability that the market maker assigns to an informed investor with good news
trading. If equilibrium is characterized by mixing, we can solve for the equilibrium value of Âi by ﬁnding
the market maker’s belief about the trading probability implicit in the updating rule ¯i(¯i+1;Yi) that leaves
the informed agent indifferent between trading and not.
The value of the informed agent’s private information with i periods remaining until his private infor-
mation is sure to be revealed publicly is:
Vi(¯i+1) = 0:5(1 ¡ ¸i)Vi¡1(¯i+1) + 0:5max
"
¸i(1 ¡ ¯i+1) ¡ 2c;(1 ¡ ¸i)Vi¡1(¯i(¯i+1;Yi = 0))
#
; (3)
where V0 = 0. In equilibrium, the market maker’s beliefs must be consistent with the informed agent’s
period trading strategies. This may require that the informed agent use a mixed trading strategy. This
reﬂects the fact that ¯i(¯i+1;Yi = 0) decreases in Âi. As a result, the market maker’s belief about the
probability of the good state falls more in response to an order ﬂow of zero when the informed agent has
a pure strategy to buy than when he has a pure strategy to defer. The equilibrium is characterized by a
non-degenerate mixed trading strategy when:
(1 ¡ ¸i)Vi¡1(¯i(¯i+1;Yi = 0;Âi = 1)) > ¸i(1 ¡ ¯i+1) ¡ 2c > (1 ¡ ¸i)Vi¡1(¯i(¯i+1;Yi = 0;Âi = 0)):
9If the informed agent mixes in equilibrium, he must be indifferent between trading and not:
¸i(1 ¡ ¯i+1) ¡ 2c = (1 ¡ ¸i)Vi¡1(¯i(¯i+1;Yi = 0)): (4)
In period 1, the right hand side of (4) is simply zero and the value function is independent of Â1, so it is
easy to compute the informed agent’s equilibrium trading probabilities: Â1(¯2) = 0 if ¯2 > 1 ¡ 2c
¸1, and
Â1(¯2) = 1 if ¯2 < 1 ¡ 2c
¸1. In period 2, we can show that the more likely the market maker believes the
good state is, the less likely the informed agent is to trade on his (good) private information:
Lemma 1 The probability that the informed agent with good news trades with two periods remaining,
Â2(¯3), decreases in ¯3; strictly decreasing with ¯3 if it is interior, 0 < Â2(¯3) < 1.
Before extending lemma 1 to the general period i case, it is useful to characterize how informed trading
intensities vary as time passes. One might conjecture that the informed agent would trade more aggressively
as the number of remaining trading opportunities falls. The following example illustrates that the analysis
is more subtle. Suppose that ¯ ¯ = 0:5, ± = 0:4, c = 0:1, ¸1 = 0:8, ¸2 = 0:5, and ¸3 = 0:49. Then,
Â3(¯ ¯) = 0:897 > 0 = Â2(¯ ¯); trading intensities do not rise uniformly as the end of the trading horizon
nears. Intuitively, because information is far more likely to become public in period 1 than period 2, (i.e.,
¸1 >> ¸2), thegainfromdeferringinperiod2inhopesofproﬁtingontradeinperiod1ishigh. Information,
however, is only marginally more likely to be revealed at the end of period 2 than period 3, so in period 3 the
choice boils down to a choice between trading in period 3 or waiting until period 1. But since his information
is sufﬁciently likely to become public before period 1, it does not pay to defer in period 3.
This non-monotonicity appears to arise because the probability of public information revelation evolves
in a convex pattern. Indeed, if the probability that the information leaks out does not vary over time, then
the informed agent’s trading intensity must rise as date T is approached:
Proposition 1 Let ¸i = ¸; 8i. Then in any period i, the informed agent trades with positive probability if
andonlyifthepriceisnottooclosetoitsfundamentalvalue, i.e., ¯ ¯ < 1¡2c
¸ . If ¯ ¯ < 1¡2c
¸ , thentheinformed
agent is more likely to submit an order as date T approaches: Âi(¯ ¯) ¸ Âi+1(¯ ¯), and Âi(¯ ¯) > Âi+1(¯ ¯) if
Âi+1(¯ ¯) < 1. Hence, as date T approaches, equilibrium prices become more sensitive to order ﬂow.
10Underlying this result is Lemma 2 that we prove in the appendix. The lemma details that if the proba-
bility of information leakage does not vary over time, then the informed agent’s expected proﬁts rise with
the number of periods available to trade on his information: Vi(¯) · Vi¡1(¯). Thus, Proposition 1 can be
interpreted as follows. When ¸i = ¸; 8i, the expected return from submitting an order, 0:5¸(1 ¡ ¯ ¯) ¡ c,
does not vary over time. Accordingly, to keep the informed agent indifferent between trading and not as time
passes, continuation proﬁts from deferring must not fall even though fewer opportunities remain in which to
beneﬁt from any price improvement gained by deferring. Hence, as time passes, the price must fall by more
following an order of zero: market maker beliefs must be revised downward by more following an order of
zero. In turn, more dramatic price revisions require that the informed agent trade more aggressively on his
information as date T approaches, so that a zero order ﬂow conveys more information.
We now extend lemma 1 to the general period i case. When the probability of information leakage
jumps in a non-convex way, it is difﬁcult to rule out the possibility of multiple solutions to (4) and hence the
possibility that the informed agent’s trading intensity rises with an increase in the market maker’s prior. To
preclude this possibility, we assume that
Assumption (A1): Âi(¯) > 0 implies that Âj(¯) > 0, 8j < i.
Proposition 1 ensures that this assumption is satisﬁed if ¸i = ¸;8i. Assumption A1 precludes multiple
solutions to (4). It allows us to extend lemma 1 and characterize the informed agent’s equilibrium trading
strategy at all dates. The next proposition details that the more likely the market maker believes the good
state is, the less likely the informed agent is to trade:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium probability with which the informed agent submits an order, Âi(¯i+1), de-
clines monotonically in ¯i+1; strictly decreasing with ¯i+1 for Âi(¯i+1) 2 (0;1).
This result is subtle. The more likely the market maker believes the good state is, the smaller are period
trading proﬁts. However, future market maker beliefs about the good state will also be higher if information
is not revealed, so future trading proﬁts are lower. Hence, to prove proposition 2, we must show that current
proﬁts fall more rapidly with ¯ than do continuation proﬁts. The assumption that Âi(¯) > 0 implies that
Âj(¯) > 0;j < i ensures that continuation payoffs following an order ﬂow of zero are a concave function
of ¯, while trading proﬁts are a linear function of ¯. Then, ceteris paribus, increasing ¯ reduces the value
11the informed agent places on trading relative to manipulating market maker beliefs. To keep the informed
agent indifferent, market maker beliefs must fall by less after an order ﬂow of zero—so that the informed
agent must be less likely to trade.
Corollary 1 characterizes when the informed agent will submit an order with positive probability.
Corollary 1 A sufﬁcient condition for there to be a non-trivial range of market maker beliefs, for which the
informed agent trades with positive probability at period i is:














and ¸1 > 2c. If ¸i = ¸, 8i, then the sufﬁcient condition reduces to ¸ > 2c — the likelihood that the private
information is revealed in the next period must exceed twice the ﬁxed trading costs.
We next characterize how the parameters describing the economy affect informed trading.
Proposition 3
² The more likely the informed agent’s information is to be revealed publicly, the more aggressively he
trades: Âi is weakly increasing in ¸i, strictly increasing for Âi 2 (0;1). If ¸i = ¸ 8i, then Âi is
weakly increasing in ¸.
² The greater are ﬁxed trading costs, the less aggressively the informed agent trades: Âi is decreasing
in c, strictly decreasing for Âi 2 (0;1).
² The more likely there is to be an informed trader, the less aggressively the informed agent trades: Âi
is weakly decreasing in ±, strictly decreasing for Âi 2 (0;1).
Theseﬁndingsareintuitive. As¸i rises, theinformedagent’sinformationismorelikelytobeimpounded
into the closing period i price, raising the expected return from a period i contract. Further, an increase in
¸i reduces the expected gain from deferring from trade, as the informed agent’s information is less likely
to remain private. Less obviously, this relation still holds when the probability that the private information
is revealed does not vary with time. There are three direct effects: an increase in ¸, (1) increases the
informed agent’s expected return from submitting an order this period; and (2) reduces the expected return
12from deferring since it increases the probability that information will be revealed before next period; but the
potentially offsetting effect, is (3) if the information is not revealed this period, the expected return from
submitting an order next period rises. We show, however, that the ﬁrst two effects dominate the third.
Higher ﬁxed trading costs (c) reduce the expected return from submitting an order. When c is high,
the beneﬁt from trading is low unless the price deviates substantially from the true value. As c rises, the
informed agent is more likely to defer from trading, hoping to obtain lower prices next period, which would
raise the net proﬁt margin.
As ± increases, the market maker believes that an informed agent is more likely, so her beliefs about
the likelihood of a good state fall more sharply following an order ﬂow of zero. Hence, as ± increases, it
becomes more proﬁtable for the informed agent to defer from trading.
4 Time-to-Maturity
Until now, we have considered only short-dated contracts that expire after one period. In practice, options
and futures contracts exist for various lengths of time. As a contract’s time until expiry increases, the
model tends to that of a long-lived trader in equity (Kyle 1985), with agents able to hold positions for as
long as it takes the market maker to learn the asset’s true value. In contrast to Kyle, in our model agents
may not commence trading once they receive (private) good news: if the price of the asset is too close
to its fundamental value an informed agent prefers to defer in the hope of manipulating the market. This
result reﬂects that our model allows for non-convexities — ﬁxed trading costs and round lot restrictions.
Kyle’snormality assumptions preclude consideration of these important non-convexities, making submitting
a sufﬁciently small order more attractive than completely delaying trade.
The next two sections explore different aspects of how a contract’s time-to-maturity affects outcomes.
Section 4.1 details that if security contracts exist for multiple periods then the informed agent’s accumulated
position affects his trading strategy. Section 4.2 provides an explanation for why markets for shorter-term
contracts are far more liquid than those for longer-term contracts.
134.1 Accumulated Position
An informed agent with an accumulated position takes into consideration that submitting an order for a
contract raises the probability that his information will be revealed, in which case his existing contracts
will then be settled for a proﬁt. This situation does not arise in equity because, as long as an informed
agent can hold his stake, his information will eventually be incorporated into the price of a previously-
accumulated position. In contrast, with short-term contracts there is a risk that the contract may expire
before the information is revealed publicly. Consequently, increasing the probability that the information
will be revealed has a positive value, a value that rises with the informed agent’s accumulated position.
An implication of Proposition 3 is that the longer is the holding period, the more aggressively the in-
formed agent trades. That is, an increase in ¸ captures the effects of a longer holding period, ignoring the
impact of an informed agent’s accumulated position on his trading behavior. We now show that an informed
agent’s accumulated position further increases the informed agent’s trading intensity.
We document this in the simplest possible context. We consider the last two periods remaining for a
long-dated contract written at the beginning of period T and expiring at the end of period 1. We assume
that ¸1 < 1, so that the informed agent’s accumulated position could expire before his information is
incorporated into the underlying asset price. Each period, market participants can purchase contracts that
expire at the end of period 1. Each period, with probability one-half, a liquidity trader places an order.
The informed agent’saccumulated position at the end of periodi+1 is
PT
¶=i+1 X¶. The informed agent’s
period i trading strategy, which depends on the size of his accumulated position, is a probability distribution
Pr
n




over feasible order sizes. In equilibrium, any informed order of
size Xi 62 f0;1g reveals the informed agent’s information to the market maker, in which case the price
reﬂects his information. Hence, without loss of generality, we need only consider the following informed
period trading strategies: (1) submit an order of size two that reveals his information; (2) submit an order of
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where V0 = 0.
Proposition 4 For any given market maker beliefs, ¯i, the expected size of the informed agent’s order in
period i, i = 1;2 increases with his accumulated position.
Proposition 4 reveals that holding both the informed agent’s information and total past (informed plus
liquidity) trade the same, future expected informed trade and hence future expected volume will be greater
when the informed agent has a greater share of past trade. That is, the market maker updates prices in the
same manner independently of who submitted the orders, but the informed agent trades more aggressively
in the future if he traded more aggressively in the past and hence acquired a greater stake.
4.2 Liquidity of Distant Contract Markets
This section investigates why option and futures contracts that are relatively close to maturity are far more
liquid than similar contracts with more distant expiration dates. This empirical regularity is especially
puzzling given the many reasons why agents might want to use longer-term contracts to hedge against long-
term risk. To do this, we extend the two-period model as follows:
² Each period, two contracts are available: a 1-period (short-dated) contract and a 2-period (long-dated)
contract. The market maker observes total order ﬂows in both markets.
² As in the basic model, each period an exogenous short-lived liquidity trader arrives with independent
probability 0.5 and trades only once. Now, unlike the basic model, this trader randomly submits
an order for either the long-dated contract or the short-dated contract with equal probability. This
structure ensures that the exogenous probability of liquidity trade is the same in each contract market.
² Atthebeginningofperiod2, along-lived liquiditytraderarriveswithindependentprobability0.5. The
trading behavior of this trader is endogenous: he can hedge against an income shock that is negatively
correlated with the good state in one of two ways: (1) buy a long-dated contract at period 2; (2) buy
15a short-dated contract at period 2, and if uncertainty about the state is not resolved, purchase a short-
dated contract at period 1. Let » be the probability that the liquidity trader buys a long-dated contract.
The trader selects the hedging strategy that minimizes his expected cost.
Thus, each period there are three potential traders: an informed agent, an endogenous liquidity trader, and
an exogenous liquidity trader. To focus on the long-term composition of trade in long- and short-dated
contracts, we assume that private information is revealed with certainty at the end of period 1, ¸1 = 1. As a
result, the informed agent has no incentive to submit a large order in period 1 in order to reveal information.
This allows us to focus on the choice between trading contracts of different maturities without complicating
the analysis with the issues related to the informed’s accumulated position that we detail in section 4.1.
We index short-dated contract variables by S and long-dated contract variables by L. Bold symbols
denote vectors: for example, Yi = (Y S
i ;Y L
i ) denotes total order ﬂows in period i for short- and long-dated
contracts. The history of total order ﬂow through period i is: Hi = fY S
T ;Y S
T¡1;:::;Y S




The informed agent’s period i strategy is a joint probability distribution over feasible orders, PrfXi =
(xS
i ;xL
i ) j v;Xi+1;Hi+1;Θi+1g. The market maker selects a set of pricing functions for each contract at




ic(Hi;Θi); j = S;L. The price for each contract depends on order
ﬂow in both markets. Because order ﬂow at period 2 provides the market maker information about the
presence of a long-lived liquidity trader, the market maker’s updating rule at period 1 depends distinctly on
both her original prior and observed past order ﬂow.
Since ¸1 = 1, orders received at period 1 for the long- and short-dated contracts are equivalent (X1 =
XS
1 = XL
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XL
2 if X1 = 0
XL
2 + 0:5(1 ¡ Σ)(2 ¡ ¯1(1;(Y2)) ¡ ¯1(2;(Y2))) + 0:5Σ(1 ¡ ¯1(2;(Y2))) ¡ c if X1 = 1
XL
2 + (1 ¡ Σ)(1 ¡ ¯1(2;(Y2))) ¡ c if X1 = 2
XL
2 ¡ c if X1 > 2,
16where Σ = Σ(Y2;X2) is the probability with which the informed agent believes a long-lived liquidity
trader purchased the short-dated contract.4
The possibility of two liquidity traders in either market means that the informed agent can submit an
order of size two, or submit orders to both markets, without being revealed for sure to the market maker.
However, lemmas 4 and 5 in the appendix show that it is never optimal for the informed agent to do so.
This result holds in period 1 even though the informed agent may know from the period 2 order ﬂow net of
his trade that there is no long-lived liquidity trader, so that the maximum liquidity trade is one, whereas the
market maker cannot make such a distinction. Restricting attention to the informed agent’s three possible
equilibrium period 2 trading strategies, his period 2 value function is:
V2 = max
X2
E [¼2 (X2) + (1 ¡ ¸2)V1 (Y2;X2)];




0 if X2 = (0;0) (defer from trading)
¸2 ¡ 1
8[2 + (1 + 2»)PL
2 (0;2) + (3 ¡ 2»)PL
2 (1;1) + 2PL
2 (0;1)] ¡ c if X2 = (0;1) (buy one long-dated)
¸2 ¡ 1
8[2 + (1 + 2»)PS
2 (1;1) + (3 ¡ 2»)PS
2 (2;0) + 2PS
2 (1;0)] ¡ c if X2 = (1;0) (buy one short-dated)
Intheappendix, wedetailhowthemarketmakerupdatesbeliefsinresponsetodifferentorderﬂows. Figure2
illustrates the period 2 strategies from the market maker’s perspective.
Analytical characterizations are difﬁcult because of the interaction between market maker beliefs and
the strategies of the endogenous long-lived liquidity trader and the informed agent. This leads us to describe
outcomesnumerically. Figure3presentsasurfacediagramofthepercentageoftradeinlong-datedcontracts,
100(0:25 + 0:5» + ±PrfXS
2 = 0;XL
2 = 1g)=(1 + ±(PrfXS
2 = 0;XL
2 = 1g + PrfXS
2 = 1;XL
2 = 0g);
for c = 0:05 and different values of ± and ¸2. For most values of ± or ¸2, most trade occurs in short-dated
contracts. Long-dated contracts draw a majority of trade only when both ± is very small (private information






Σ((0;¢);(¢;¢)) = Σ((1;0);(1;0)) = Σ((1;1);(1;1)) = Σ((1;1);(1;0)) = Σ((2;0);(2;0)) = 0
Σ((1;0);(0;0)) = Σ((1;1);(0;1)) = Σ((2;0);(1;0)) =
:25(1 ¡ »)
:25(1 ¡ ») + 0:125
;
Σ((1;1);(0;0)) = 1 ¡ »; Σ((2;0);(0;0)) = 1:
17is unlikely) and ¸2 is very small (so a liquidity trader is still likely to need to hedge at period 1). Short-dated
contracts draw most trade despite relatively high ﬁxed costs, which increase the relative cost of rolling over
nearby contracts. Similar outcomes hold for values of c · 0:05. Note that c = 0:05 represents ﬁxed trading
costs equal to 5% of the maximum value of the contract, and more than 10% of the maximum potential
proﬁt—so that ﬁxed costs above 5% are unreasonable. Thus, we ﬁnd that for reasonable parameterizations,
trade is concentrated in short-dated (nearby) contracts.
To understand better why trade concentrates in short-dated contracts in equilibrium, we explore how a
long-lived liquidity trader’s expected total trading cost varies as we exogenously alter the probability with
which he submits an order for the long-dated contract, and then compute the consistent optimal informed
trading strategies and “equilibrium” zero-proﬁt pricing. Figure 4 shows that for almost all realistic parameter
ranges, the long-lived liquidity trader’s expected costs are minimized if he primarily trades short-dated con-
tracts. Figure5providestheeconomicintuition: asliquiditytrade,», inlong-datedcontractsisincreased, the
informed agents trade the long-dated contract with increasing probability (given the “equilibrium” pricing
associated with higher liquidity trade).
Long-dated contracts allow the informed agent either to accumulate a larger position or to trade less fre-
quently (reducing the probability of being uncovered), so that adverse selection costs faced by a long-lived
liquidity trader tend to rise with the probability that he hedges using the long-dated contract. Notice, how-
ever, that the liquidity trader’s expected costs are not minimized by always buying the short-dated contract
(» = 0). This is because a small increase in », say from 0 to 0.03, “raises” the (consistent) likelihood with
which the informed agent trades the long-dated contract from 0.303 to 0.369. This highlights the tradeoff
faced by the long-lived liquidity trader: raising » improves prices in the short-dated contract by reducing
adverse selection costs in those contracts; but raising » also “causes” the long-lived liquidity trader to buy
more long-dated contracts, which are more expensive (informed trade in these contracts is more likely). The
added cost of the long-dated contracts quickly dominates as » rises.
Figures 4 and 5 reﬂected parameterizations for which the informed agent always traded in period 2,
mixing only over which contract to trade. Now consider parameterizations where the informed agent may
defer from trading at period 2 in equilibrium, such as when ¸2 is small. In this situation, the informed
mixes between deferring from trade and submitting an order for the long-dated contract. Now, if the long-
18lived liquidity trader increases the frequency with which he trades the short-dated contract (i.e., reduces
»), this may cause the informed agent to raise the probability that he defers from trading. Thus, for these
parameterizations, the long-lived liquidity trader often optimally trades only the short-dated contract.
Figure 6 illustrates how the long-lived liquidity trader’s mixing probability varies with the ﬁxed trading
cost, c. This ﬁgure clearly illustrates the liquidity trader’s preference for a “pooling” equilibrium outcome.
For small c, the liquidity trader almost always buys the short-dated contract. As c increases, the liquidity
trader ﬁrst begins to trade slightly more of the long-dated contract, but as c rises marginally further, he
dramatically changes and trades long-dated contracts almost exclusively. Intuitively, once c is sufﬁciently
high, the added trading cost from buying two short-dated contracts exceeds the higher adverse selection
costs in the long-dated contract.
Figure 7 illustrates how the percentage of total trade in long-dated contracts varies with c when ± = 0:4
and ¸2 = 0:8. For this parameterization, the percentage of trade in long-dated contracts rises with the ﬁxed
trading cost c, as one might expect. Figure 8, however, reveals that trade in long-dated contracts need not
always rise with c. Figure 8 details outcomes when ¸2 = 0:2 so that private information is unlikely to be
revealed at period 2. If c is small, raising c reduces trade in long-dated contracts. It is possibilities such as
this that preclude analytical characterizations. Indeed, neither total expected trade across contracts, nor total
expected trade in the long-dated contract need be monotone in c. To understand why, consider ﬁrst how
liquidity trade varies with c, and then consider how informed trade varies.
The long-lived liquidity trader’s strategy, », is generally insensitive to small changes in ﬁxed trading
costs, because he prefers to trade almost exclusively in one of the two contracts. From the long-lived
liquidity trader’s perspective, increasing c raises the attractiveness of trading long-dated contracts in terms
of transaction costs. For low values of c, this beneﬁt fails to offset the far higher adverse selection costs
associated with moving away from a pooling equilibrium in short-dated contracts toward trading both short-
and long-dated contracts, nor is it sufﬁcient to prompt the liquidity trader to trade only the long-dated
contracts. There exists a very narrow range of c such that over this range the transaction costs dominate
adverse selection costs and the liquidity trader switches from almost always trading short-dated contracts to
almost always trading long-dated contracts. For other values of c, changes in the share of trade in short- and
long-dated contracts are driven by changes in the informed agent’s behavior.
19The informed agent’s behavior depends critically on whether or not his information is likely to be re-
vealed at period 2. Consider ﬁxed trading costs c for which the long-lived liquidity trader almost always
trades the short-dated contract and consider the impact of raising c for:
Case 1: information is likely to be revealed (large¸2): Then, the informed agent always trades at period 2,
mixing between the short- and long-dated contracts. The high probability of information leakage at period 2
raises the attractiveness of trading, reducing the distinction between short- and long-dated contracts. When
ﬁxed transaction costs rise, the informed agent switches from trading short-dated contracts to trading long-
dated contracts. As a result, the percentage of trade in long-dated contracts rises.
Case 2: information is unlikely to be revealed (small ¸2): When ¸2 is sufﬁciently low, then independent
of market maker’s beliefs, it is never optimal for the informed agent to submit an order for the short-dated
contract: if information is unlikely to be revealed during period 2, the short-dated contract purchased at
period 2 is likely to expire worthlessly. When ﬁxed transaction costs rise, the informed agent switches from
trading long-dated contracts to deferring from trade at period 2. The net effect is that the percentage of trade
in long-dated contracts falls.
Thus, higher ﬁxed trading costs may not increase the share of trade in long-dated contracts. Finally, to
understand why total expected trade need not fall as ﬁxed trading costs rise, suppose that ¸2 is small, and
c is low enough that liquidity traders trade the short-dated contract. Then as c rises, the informed agent
increasingly defers from trading (as information is unlikely to be revealed), reducing total expected trade.
But eventually, c rises by enough that long-lived liquidity traders switch to trading long-dated contracts.
Once c is high enough that long-lived liquidity traders almost always trade long-dated contracts, adverse
selection costs for these contracts fall so that it suddenly becomes proﬁtable for the informed agent to trade
long-dated contracts heavily; and as a result total trade rises.
These ﬁndings provide insights into the patterns of trade in long- and short-dated contracts. During
the past few years, a large number of long-dated contracts have been introduced in an attempt to satisfy a
demand by market participants to hedge long-term risk. Despite active promotion by exchanges and over-
the-counter dealers, however, most long-dated contract markets are highly illiquid. Our characterizations
reveal that for reasonable levels of ﬁxed trading costs, long-dated contract markets are likely to thrive only
in environments where informational asymmetries are slight. Thus, markets where there are minimal infor-
20mational asymmetries (e.g. weather derivatives) might be expected to have liquid markets at longer horizons;
but markets with substantial informational asymmetries (e.g. equity derivatives) should not.
Finally, our results suggest that if exchanges hope to inﬂuence equilibrium outcomes by changing ﬁxed
trading costs, then the impact on liquidity may be more subtle than they might anticipate. To whit, when
information is likely to remain privately held, increasing relative trading costs in short-dated contracts may
raise trade in short-dated contracts because it reduces the attractiveness to informed agents of trading on
long-term information, thereby lowering adverse selection costs.
5 Conclusion
Despite its importance, strategic trading of short-lived securities, such as option or futures contracts, has
largely been ignored by the academic literature. This paper documents important differences between the
strategic trading of short-lived securities and that of equity:
1. The shorter horizon in which information must be impounded for a short-lived security to pay off
makes an informed agent more reluctant to trade, especially when the informed’s information is
longer-term in nature. Given innocuous technical conditions, informed trading intensities rise over
the trading horizon so that prices become more sensitive to order ﬂow.
2. With short-lived securities, the greater a risk neutral informed agent’s holdings of the short-lived
security, ceteris paribus, the more aggressively he trades in the future. In contrast, in equity markets,
an informed agent’s accumulated position does not affect his trading behavior.
3. For reasonable parameter ranges, liquidity traders prefer to incur extra costs to roll over their short-
term positions rather than trade in distant contracts, precisely because equilibrium adverse selection
costs are smaller in shorter-contracts. This allows us to reconcile the puzzling empirical ﬁnding that
markets for longer-term contracts have little liquidity and large spreads.
216 Appendix
6.1 Derivations for Section 4.2
To clarify the exposition in section 4.2, we omitted the details regarding the market maker’s updating rules.
For completeness, we present those updating rules here. We adopt the notation:
½N = PrfXS
2 = 0;XL
2 = 0g = probability informed agent defers from trade at period 2;
½L = PrfXS
2 = 0;XL
2 = 1g = probability informed agent buys a long-dated contract at period 2;
½S = PrfXS
2 = 1;XL
2 = 0g = probability informed agent buys a short-dated contract at period 2:
If the market maker observes three (or more) orders in aggregate (Y S
2 + Y L
2 ¸ 3) in period 2, she knows
the good state occured and updates her beliefs accordingly (¯2 = 1). The remainder of the period 2 market
maker updating rules are:
¯2(0;0) =
1 ¡ ±[½L + ½S]
2 ¡ ±[½L + ½S]
¯2(1;0) =
(3 ¡ 2»)(1 ¡ ± + ±½N) + 2±½S
(3 ¡ 2»)(2 ¡ ± + ±½N) + 2±½S
¯2(0;1) =
(1 + 2»)(1 ¡ ± + ±½N) + 2±½L
(1 + 2»)(2 ¡ ± + ±½N) + 2±½L
¯2(1;1) =
1 + 2±(»½S + (1 ¡ »)½L)
2 + 2±(»½S + (1 ¡ »)½L)
¯2(2;0) =
(3 ¡ 2»)±½S + (1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ ± + ±½N)
(3 ¡ 2»)±½S + (1 ¡ »)(2 ¡ ± + ±½N)
¯2(0;2) =
2»±½L + »±½N + »(1 ¡ ±) + ±½L
2»±½L + »±½N + »(2 ¡ ±) + ±½L
The market maker’s period 1 updating rules reﬂect the fact that period 2 order ﬂow provides information





1 ¡ ±[½L + ½S]
2 ¡ ±[½L + ½S]
¯1(1;(0;1)) =
1 + 2» ¡ ±[(1 + 2»)(1 ¡ ½N) ¡ 2½L]
2 + 2» ¡ ±[(1 + 2»)(1 ¡ ½N) ¡ 2½L]
¯1(1;(1;0)) =
2(1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ ±) + 2±½S + ±½N + 1 ¡ ±
2(1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ ±) + 2±½S + ±½N + 1 ¡ ± + (3 ¡ 2»)
¯1(1;(1;1)) =
1 ¡ ±[(1 + »)½N ¡ 2»½S]
2 ¡ ±[(1 ¡ »)½N ¡ 2»½S]
22¯1(1;(0;2)) =
2»±½L + »±½N + »(1 ¡ ±) + ±½L
2»±½L + »±½N + »(2 ¡ ±) + ±½L
¯1(1;(2;0)) =
(1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ ±) + ±½S
(1 ¡ »)(2 ¡ ±) + ±½S
¯1(2;(1;1)) =
2»±½S + 3±½L ¡ 2»±½L + ±½N + (1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ ±) + ±½S
2»±½S + 3±½L ¡ 2»±½L + ±½N + (1 ¡ »)(2 ¡ ±) + ±½S
¯1(2;(2;0)) =
2(1 ¡ »)±½S + (1 ¡ »)±½N + ±½S + (1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ ±)
2(1 ¡ »)±½S + (1 ¡ »)±½N + ±½S + (1 ¡ »)(2 ¡ ±)
¯1(2;(1;0)) =
(1 ¡ »)±½N + (1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ ±) + ±½S + 0:5±½N
(1 ¡ »)±½N + (1 ¡ »)(2 ¡ ±) + ±½S + 0:5±½N
If the market maker received three or more orders in aggregate in either period 2 or period 1, then she assigns
¯1 = 1. There are three additional order ﬂow combinations that reveal the existence of the informed agent
to the market maker:
¯1(2;(0;0)) = ¯1(2;(0;1)) = ¯1(2;(0;2)) = 1


















±(1 ¡ ½N) + (1 + 0:5±½N ¡ 0:5± + ±½L)¯2(1;1)¸2 + (1 + 0:5±½N ¡ 0:5±
+±½S)¯2(2;0)¸2 + 2(1 + 0:5±½N ¡ 0:5±)¯2(1;0)¸2
¸
+ c + 0:125(1 ¡ ¸2)
·
0:5±(½N + 2½L)
+(0:5±½N + 1 ¡ 0:5± + ±½L)¯1(2;(1;1)) + (1 ¡ 0:5±)¯1(1;(1;1)) + 0:5±(½N + 2½S)
+(0:5±½N + 1 ¡ 0:5± + ±½S)¯1(2;(2;0)) + (1 ¡ 0:5±)¯1(1(2;0)) + ±½N
+2(1 ¡ 0:5± + 0:5±½N)¯1(2(1;0)) + 2(1 ¡ 0:5±)¯1(1(1;0))
¸
+ (1 ¡ ¸2)(1 ¡ 0:25±(½S + ½L))c














Proof of Lemma 1: Let LHS and RHS be the values of the left- and right- hand sides of equation (4).
Clearly, LHS < 0 for ¯3 > 1 ¡ 2c¸¡1
2 . Since RHS ¸ 0, any solution to (4), if one exists, must occur
for ¯3 < 1 ¡ 2c¸¡1
2 . Intuitively, the informed agent only submits an order with positive probability if the
23expected one-period return from doing so is positive. We know: (a) ¯2(¯3;Y2 = 0) < ¯3; (b) ¸1 ¸ ¸2.





, it must be that 0:5¸1(1 ¡ ¯2(¯3;Y2 = 0)) ¡ c > 0 and the RHS can be
expanded as:
(1 ¡ ¸2)[0:5¸1(1 ¡ ¯2(¯3;Y2 = 0)) ¡ c]: (5)
Holding Â2 constant, the ﬁrst derivative of (5) with respect to ¯3 is
¡0:5¸1(1 ¡ ¸2)(1 ¡ Â2±)(1 ¡ Â2±¯3)¡2 < 0
and the second derivative of (5) with respect to ¯3 is ¡¸1(1 ¡ ¸2)Â2±(1 ¡ Â2±)(1 ¡ Â2±¯3)
¡3 < 0: Thus,





. The derivative of LHS with respect to ¯3 is ¡¸2 < 0.
Hence, there is at most one solution to (4) for ¯3 2 [0;1]. Holding Â2 “ﬁxed” at a solution to (4) at period 2,
it follows that LHS must fall more quickly with an increase in ¯3 than RHS. Thus, to preserve equality,
since LHS is independent of Â2 and RHS rises with Â2, the mixing probability Â2 must fall with ¯3, falling
strictly for Â2 2 (0;1).
Lemma 2 If ¸i = ¸ 8i, then Vi(¯) ¸ Vi¡1(¯) 8¯ 2 [0;1]; 8i.
Proof of Lemma 2: Case 1: If ¯ ¸ 1¡2c¸¡1, then Vi(¯) = (1¡¸)i¡1V1(¯) = 0. Then Vi(¯) = Vi¡1(¯).
Case 2: If ¯ < 1 ¡ 2c¸¡1, then Vi(¯) = 0:5(1 ¡ ¸)Vi¡1(¯) + 0:5[¸(1 ¡ ¯ ¯) ¡ 2c] and Vi¡1(¯) =
0:5(1¡¸)Vi¡2(¯)+0:5[¸(1¡ ¯ ¯)¡2c]. It follows that Vi(¯) > Vi¡1(¯) if and only if Vi¡1(¯) > Vi¡2(¯).
Since V1 = 0:5[¸(1 ¡ ¯ ¯) ¡ 2c] > V0 = 0, the result follows from induction.
Proof of Proposition 1: The mixing probability Âi(¯ ¯) solves ¸(1 ¡ ¯ ¯) ¡ 2c = (1 ¡ ¸)Vi¡1(¯i(¯ ¯;0)). The
proposition has two parts (A and B):
Part A: We show that ¯ ¯ < 1 ¡ 2c¸¡1 is necessary and sufﬁcient for Âi(¯ ¯) > 0.
Necessity: If ¯ ¯ ¸ 1 ¡ 2c¸¡1, then ¸(1 ¡ ¯ ¯) ¡ 2c < 0. Since Vi¡1(¢) ¸ 0 8i, the informed agent defers.
Sufﬁciency: Proof by induction.
Period 1: If ¯ ¯ < 1 ¡ 2c¸¡1, then 0:5¸(1 ¡ ¯ ¯) ¡ c > 0 and the informed agent submits an order.
Period 2: If ¯ ¯ < 1¡2c¸¡1 and Â1(¯ ¯) = 1, then ¸(1¡ ¯ ¯)¡2c > (1¡¸)V1(¯ ¯) = (1¡¸)0:5[¸(1¡ ¯ ¯)¡2c]:
24That is, if the market maker believes that the informed agent will defer, then the informed agent’s expected
return from submitting an order exceeds his expected continuation payoff. Thus, in equilibrium, Â2(¯ ¯) > 0.
Arbitrary period i: If ¯ ¯ < 1 ¡ 2c
¸ and Âj(¯ ¯) > 0 8j < i, then





p=1[0:5(1 ¡ ¸)]p: Hence, Âi(¯ ¯) > 0.
Part B:
Case 1: If Âi(¯ ¯) = 1, then it follows immediately that Âi(¯ ¯) ¸ Âi+1(¯ ¯).
Case 2: If Âi(¯ ¯) = 0, then from part A it follows that ¸(1 ¡ ¯ ¯) ¡ 2c < 0 and Âi+1(¯ ¯) = 0.
Case 3: If Âi(¯ ¯) 2 (0;1) then either Âi+1(¯ ¯) 2 (0;1] or Âi+1(¯ ¯) = 0, then
(1 ¡ ¸)Vi+1(¯i(¯ ¯;0)) = (1 ¡ ¸)Vi(¯i+1(¯ ¯;0)) = ¸(1 ¡ ¯ ¯) ¡ 2c
Hence, Vi+1(¯i(¯ ¯;0)) = Vi(¯i+1(¯ ¯;0)). From lemma 2, this occurs only if ¯i(¯ ¯;0) < ¯i+1(¯ ¯;0). Since
@¯i(¯ ¯;0)
@Âi · 0, it follows that Âi(¯ ¯) > Âi+1(¯ ¯).
Proof of Proposition 2: Interior values for period i trading probabilities Âi(¯i+1) must solve equation (4).
LetLHS(i)andRHS(i)betheperiodivaluesoftheleft-andright-handsidesof(4). Clearly,LHS(i) < 0
for ¯i+1 > 1 ¡ 2c
¸i. Since RHS(i) ¸ 0, any solution to (4) must occur for ¯i+1 < 1 ¡ 2c
¸i. We know: (a)
market maker beliefs are non-increasing in response to aggregate order ﬂows of 0 or 1 (¯i(¯i+1;Yi 2
f0;1g) < ¯i+1 8i); and (b) the probability of information leakage is non-decreasing, (¸i ¸ ¸i+1; 8i).






0:5¸i (1 ¡ ¯j (¯i+1;fYj;Yj+1;:::;Yig)) ¡ c > 0; 8j < i: (6)
Using an induction argument and (A1), we now show that if Âj declines with ¯j+1, 8j < i, then Âi falls
with ¯i+1.





= 1 for ¯2 < 1 ¡ 2c
¸1
2 [0;1] for ¯2 = 1 ¡ 2c
¸1
= 0 for ¯2 > 1 ¡ 2c
¸1
25We also showed in lemma 1 that Â2 fell with ¯3.





, expand RHS(i = 3) as:
:5(1 ¡ ¸3)
h
(1 ¡ ¸2)(:5¸1(1 ¡ ¯3(¯4;0)) ¡ c)
+maxf¸2(1 ¡ ¯3(¯4;0)) ¡ 2c; (1 ¡ ¸2)(:5¸1(1 ¡ ¯2(¯3(¯4;0);0)) ¡ c)g
i
; (7)
using (6). Let ¯4 2 (0;¯¤
4) denote the range of ¯4 such that Â3(¯4) > 0. From assumption (A1), if
Â3(¯4) > 0, then Â2(¯4) > 0. Further Â3(¯4) > 0 implies Â2(¯3(¯4;0)) > 0 because: (a) ¯3(¯4;0) · ¯4;
and (b) Â2(¯) is falling in ¯. Hence, we need only consider (7) for ¯4 corresponding to Â2(¯3(¯4;0)) > 0.
Since LHS(i = 3) > RHS(i = 3) for ¯4 ¸ 1 ¡ 2c
¸3, (A1) implies that if Â3(¯4) > 0 then LHS(i =
3) > RHS(i = 3) for ¯4 > ¯¤
4. Given these observations and the fact that the derivative of LHS(i = 3)
with respect to ¯4 is constant and equal to ¡¸3 < 0, a sufﬁcient condition to ensure at most one solution
exists to (4) evaluated at period 3 is that
(1 ¡ ¸3)[0:5(1 ¡ ¸2)(0:5¸1(1 ¡ ¯3(¯4;0)) ¡ c) + 0:5¸2(1 ¡ ¯3(¯4;0)) ¡ c] (8)
be strictly concave. Expression (8) corresponds to RHS(i = 3) evaluated over ¯4 2 (0;¯¤
4). Holding Â3
constant, the ﬁrst derivative of (8) with respect to ¯4 is




and the second derivative is





Thus RHS(i = 3) is strictly concave for ¯4 2 (0;¯¤
4) and there is at most one solution to (4) at period
3. Holding Â3 “ﬁxed” at a solution to (4) at period 3, it follows that LHS(i = 3) falls more quickly with
an increase in ¯4 than RHS(i = 3). To preserve equality, since LHS(i = 3) is independent of Â3 and
RHS(i = 3) rises with Â3, the mixing probability Â3 must decline with ¯4, strictly falling if Â3 2 (0;1).
Period i: By induction. Suppose the informed’s mixing probability for periods j < i, falls with ¯j+1.
Using the same logic as for period 3, we show that if Âi(¯i+1) > 0, then Âj(¯) > 0; 8¯ · ¯i+1; 8j < i.
Let ¯¤
i+1 be the maximum ¯i+1 such that Âi(¯i+1) > 0. Hence, possible solutions for the period i analog of
equation (4) are in some range ¯i+1 2 (0;¯¤






































Thus, (9) is strictly concave over ¯i+1 2 (0;¯¤
i+1). Since the derivative of LHS(i) with respect to ¯i+1
is constant and equal to ¡¸i < 0 and since, by assumption, LHS(i) > RHS(i) if Âj(¯) = 0 for j < i
and ¯ < ¯i+1, there can be no more than one solution to (4) in period i. Holding Âi “ﬁxed” at a solution
to (4) at period 3, it follows that LHS(i) falls more quickly with an increase in ¯i+1 than RHS(i). To
preserve equality, since LHS(i) is independent of Âi and RHS(i) rises with Âi, the mixing probability Âi
must decrease with ¯i+1, strictly decreasing for Âi 2 (0;1).
Proof of Corollary 1: Clearly, the RHS(i) and LHS(i) of (4) are continuous and decreasing in ¯i+1, and
LHS(i) > RHS(i) for ¯i+1 ¸ 1 ¡ 2c
¸i. Hence, a sufﬁcient condition for the informed agent to trade with
positive probability at period i is that RHS(i) > LHS(i) evaluated at ¯i+1 = 0:









for i > 1 and corresponds to ¸i > 2c for i = 1. Given (A1), if (10) holds at period i, the informed agent
will submit an order each period j, j · i. When ¸i = ¸ 8i, (10) becomes
¸ ¡ 2c > (¸ ¡ 2c)
Xi¡1
p=1[0:5(1 ¡ ¸)]p: (11)
If ¸ ¡ 2c > 0, this is always satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics):
1a. Change in ¸i: Interior values for the period i trading probabilities Âi(¯i+1) must solve (4). When
¸i decreases, LHS(i) decreases and (1 ¡ ¸i) increases. In order to maintain equality, it follows that
Vi¡1(¯i(¯i+1;0)) decreases and therefore Âi(¯i+1) decreases.
271b. Change in ¸: The period i analog to (4) for the case where ¸i = ¸ is
¸(1 ¡ ¯i+1) ¡ 2c = (1 ¡ ¸)Vi¡1(¯i(¯i+1;0)): (12)
Let LHS¤(i) and RHS¤(i) be the period i values of the left-hand side and the right-hand side, respectively,






and (b) Âj(¯) > 0 8j8¯ < 1 ¡ 2c
¸ . Hence, for interior values of Âi(¯i+1)
Vi¡1(¯i(¯i+1;0)) = 0:5(1 ¡ ¸)Vi¡2(¯i(¯i+1;0)) + 0:5¸(1 ¡ ¯i(¯i+1;0)) ¡ c:
The proof proceeds as follows:
Period 1: Recall that Â1(¯2) = 1 if ¯2 < 1 ¡ 2c
¸ and Â1(¯2) = 0 if ¯2 > 1 ¡ 2c








¸2 > 0, it follows that Â1(¯2) is weakly increasing in ¸.
Period 2: Observe that
¸
@LHS¤(i=2)










¡ (1 ¡ ¸)c
< ¸(1 ¡ ¸)@V1





@¸ . To maintain the equality, Â2(¯3) must increase.
Period i: The argument used for period 2 is extended to any period i. Deﬁne
ai =
Xi¡1








@¸ ¡ aic = (1 ¡ ¸)
hPi¡1
p=1[:5(1 ¡ ¸)]p¡1[:5¸(1 ¡ ¯i(¯i+1;0)) ¡ Vi¡1¡p ¡ c]
i
< (1 ¡ ¸)
hPi¡1
p=1[0:5(1 ¡ ¸)]p¡1[0:5¸(1 ¡ ¯i(¯i+1;0)) ¡ c]
i





@¸ . To maintain the equality, Âi(¯i+1) must increase. Thus, Âi(¯i+1) is
weakly increasing in ¸.
2. Change in c: Interior values of the mixing probability Âi are deﬁned by (4). Differentiating LHS(i) and



















To restore equilibrium, RHS(i) must decrease. Hence, Âi must fall.











As ± increases, ¯i(¯i+1;0) falls and Vi¡1(¯i(¯i+1;0)) increases. Hence, RHS(i) of (4) rises with ±. Since
LHS(i) does not vary with ±, Âi must fall to restore the mixing equilibrium condition given by (4).
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, the informed agent never places an order of size two at period i, i ¸ 2.




¡ c. The informed
agent can realize a higher expected return by deferring each period from period i to period 2 and, if his
information has not yet been revealed, submit an order of size two at period 1. This alternative strategy has
expected return
PT







¶=i+1 X¶ ¡ c; ¸j > 0;j = 2;:::;i.









> > > <
> > > :
1 if X1 = 2
0:5 + 0:5¸1 if X1 = 1



























For period 2, Lemma 3 ensures that the informed agent never submits an order of size two. Conditional
on
PT











¶=3 X¶ + 1
¶
+ 0:5¸2 (1 ¡ P2(X2 = 1;H3))
¡c + 0:5(1 + ¸2)
XT
¶=3 X¶;


























If submit(Q)¡defer(Q) ¸ submit( ˜ Q)¡defer( ˜ Q), for all Q > ˜ Q, then the relative value of submitting
an order is weakly increasing in the size of the informed agent’s accumulated position. Rewriting this
condition yields
µ




Q¡ ˜ Q¡[V1(1;Q)¡V1(1; ˜ Q)]
¶
¸ 0; (14)
where we suppress the order ﬂow history, H3, and only report Y2 to conserve space.
Equation (13) shows that the magnitude of the increase in the value of the informed agent’s information
at period 1, due to an increase in (
PT
¶=2 X¶), rises with X1. It also ensures that for any given market
maker beliefs, the informed agent is more likely to submit a larger order at period 1 as (
PT
¶=2 X¶) increases.
These two observations imply that V1(1;Q + 1) ¡ V1(1; ˜ Q + 1) ¸ V1(1;Q) ¡ V1(1; ˜ Q). To show that
Q¡ ˜ Q ¸ V1(0;Q)¡V1(0; ˜ Q), weﬁrstobservethatequation(13)impliesthatargmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2;Q)] ¸
argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2; ˜ Q)]. Consider each possible case:
(1) If argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2;Q)] = argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2; ˜ Q)], then




¸1(Q ¡ ˜ Q) if argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2;Q)] = 0
0:5(1 + ¸1)(Q ¡ ˜ Q) if argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2;Q)] = 1
Q ¡ ˜ Q if argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2;Q)] = 2
:
(2) If argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2;Q)] = 2 and argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2; ˜ Q)] = 1, then
˜ Q < 0:5¸2 (1 ¡ P2(X2 = 1;H3)) + 0:5(1 + ¸1) ˜ Q:
Then V1(0;Q) ¡ V1(0; ˜ Q) = Q ¡ 0:5¸2 (1 ¡ P2(X2 = 1;H3)) ¡ 0:5(1 + ¸1) ˜ Q < Q ¡ ˜ Q.
(3) If argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2;Q)] = 1 and argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2; ˜ Q)] = 0, then
0:5¸2 (1 ¡ P2(X2 = 1;H3)) ¡ c + 0:5(1 + ¸) ˜ Q < ¸ ˜ Q
0:5¸2 (1 ¡ P2(X2 = 1;H3)) ¡ c + 0:5(1 + ¸) ˜ Q + 0:5(1 + ¸)(Q ¡ ˜ Q) ¡ ¸ ˜ Q < Q ¡ ˜ Q
Then V1(0;Q) ¡ V1(0; ˜ Q) = 0:5¸2 (1 ¡ P2(X2 = 1;H3)) ¡ c + 0:5(1 + ¸)Q ¡ ¸ ˜ Q < Q ¡ ˜ Q.
30(4) Finally, if argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2;Q)] = 2 and argmaxX1E[¼1(X1jH2; ˜ Q)] = 0, then ˜ Q¡c¡¸ ˜ Q < 0.
This implies directly that V1(0;Q) ¡ V1(0; ˜ Q) = Q ¡ c ¡ ¸ ˜ Q < Q ¡ ˜ Q.
These observations ensure that condition (14) is satisﬁed, and hence, Â2(X2 = 1j
PT
¶=3 X¶ = Q;¢) ¸
Â2(X2 = 1j
PT
¶=3 X¶ = ˜ Q;¢);8Q > ˜ Q.
Lemma 4 In equilibrium, the informed agent never submits an order for more than one contract at period 1.
E [¼1(1;Y2;X2) ¡ ¼1(2;Y2;X2)] = (1¡Σ)(1¡0:5¯1(1;Y2)¡0:5¯1(2;Y2))+Σ(0:5¡0:5¯1(1;Y2))¡
(1 ¡ Σ)(1 ¡ ¯1(2;Y2)) = 0:5(1 ¡ Σ)(¯1(2;Y2) ¡ ¯1(1;Y2)) + 0:5Σ(1 ¡ ¯1(1;Y2) > 0 where
Σ = Σ(Y2;X2). The result then follows from ¯1(2;Y2) > ¯1(1;Y2) and 1 > ¯1(1;Y2).
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, the informed agent never submits an order involving two contracts at period 2.
The more aggressive period 2 strategy is most proﬁtable when ¸2 = 1 (i.e., when continuation proﬁts do not
matter). The following three cases show that strategies involving two contracts are still less proﬁtable than
strategies involving one contract, even for the most favorable parameter values.
Case 1:
E [¼2 (X2 = (0;2)) ¡ ¼2 (X2 = (0;1))] = 1 + 1
8 [¡10 + (3 ¡ 2»)(¯2(1;1) ¡ ¯2(0;2)) + 2¯2(0;1)]:
This is negative iff (3 ¡ 2»)(¯2(1;1) ¡ ¯2(0;2)) < 2(1 ¡ ¯2(0;1)). The desired result follows from:
0:5(1 + 2±(»½S + (1 ¡ »)½L)) < 2:5
) 3(1 + 2±(»½S + (1 ¡ »)½L)) < 2:5(1 + 2±(»½S + (1 ¡ »)½L)) + 2:5:
Rearranging, we have 3¯2(1;1) < 2:5. Thus, given that ¯2(0;1) · ¯2(0;2) and ¯2(0;2) > 0:5, it
follows that: 3¯2(1;1) + 2¯2(0;1) < 2 + 3¯2(0;2) ) 3(¯2(1;1) ¡ ¯2(0;2)) < 2(1 ¡ ¯2(0;1)) )
(3 ¡ 2»)(¯2(1;1) ¡ ¯2(0;2)) < 2(1 ¡ ¯2(0;1)).
Case 2:
E [¼2 (X2 = (2;0)) ¡ ¼2 (X2 = (1;0))] = 1 + 1
8 [¡10 + (1 + 2»)(¯2(1;1) ¡ ¯2(2;0)) + 2¯2(1;0)]:
31Thisisnegativeiff(1+2»)(¯2(1;1) ¡ ¯2(2;0)) < 2(1 ¡ ¯2(1;0)). Fromcase1, weknowthat3¯2(1;1) <
2:5. Since ¯2(1;0) · ¯2(2;0) and ¯2(2;0) > 0:5, the desired result follows from: 3¯2(1;1) + 2¯2(1;0) <
2 + 3¯2(2;0) ) 3(¯2(1;1) ¡ ¯2(2;0)) < 2(1 ¡ ¯2(1;0)) ) (1 + 2»)(¯2(1;1) ¡ ¯2(2;0)) < 2(1 ¡
¯2(1;0)).
Case 3:
E [¼2(X2 = (1;1)) ¡ ¼2(X2 = (1;0))] = (1¡c)+ 1
8 [¡10 + (3 ¡ 2»)(¯2(2;0) ¡ ¯2(1;1)) + 2¯2(1;0)]:
This is negative iff (3 ¡ 2»)(¯2(2;0) ¡ ¯2(1;1)) < 2(1 ¡ ¯2(1;0)). This will always be true for » > 0:5.
For» · 0:5, theresultfollowsfrom: (3¡2»)±½S+(1¡»)(1¡±+±½N)+5» < 5implies3((3¡2»)±½S+(1¡
»)(1¡±+±½N)) < 2:5((3¡2»)±½S+(1¡»)(1¡±+±½N))+2:5(1¡»). Rearranging, wehave¯2(2;0) < 2:5.
Since ¯2(1;1) ¸ ¯2(0;1) and ¯2(1;1) > 0:5, it follows that: 3¯2(2;0) + 2¯2(0;1) < 2 + 3¯2(1;1) )
3(¯2(2;0) ¡ ¯2(1;1)) < 2 ¡ 2¯2(1;0) ) (3 ¡ 2»)(¯2(2;0) ¡ ¯2(1;1)) < 2(1 ¡ ¯2(1;0)).
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Figure 1: Period trading strategies and total order ﬂow based on the basic model outlined in section 2. The




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Period 2 trading strategies, total informed order ﬂow and total liquidity order ﬂow based on the
model outlined in section 4.2. The probabilities associated with each strategy reﬂect those used by the
market maker to update her beliefs.



























Figure 3: Surface diagram of the percentage of trade in long-dated contracts given ﬁxed transaction costs
equal to c = 0:05 for different values of ± (the probability an informed agent has private information) and
¸2 (the probability of an information leakage in period 2). The percentage of trade in long-dated contracts
is calculated as (100(0:25 + 0:5» + ±PrfXS
2 = 0;XL
2 = 1g)=(1 + ±(PrfXS
2 = 0;XL
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» (Probability long-lived liquidity trader submits order for long-dated contract)
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Figure 4: Long-lived liquidity trader’s expected total cost (E[CT]) as a function of his mixing probability ».
The long-lived liquidity trader always purchases the short-dated contract when » = 0 and always purchases
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Figure 5: Informed agent’s probability of submitting an order to the long-dated contract market (PrfXS
2 =
0;XL
2 = 1g) as a ”best response” to the long-lived liquidity trader’s mixing probability ». The long-lived
liquidity trader always purchases the short-dated contract when » = 0 and always purchases the long-dated
contract when » = 1. Parameter values: ± = :5, c = :01, and ¸2 = :8. For these parameters, it is always
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Figure 6: Liquidity trader’s preference for “pooling equilibrium”. The long-lived liquidity trader’s
mixing probability » as a function of the ﬁxed transaction cost c. The long-lived liquidity trader always
purchases the short-dated contract when » = 0 and always purchases the long-dated contract when » = 1.
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Figure 7: High probability of information revelation at period 2. The percentage of total order ﬂow in
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Figure 8: Low probability of information revelation at period 2. The percentage of total order ﬂow in
long-dated contracts as a function of the ﬁxed transaction cost c. Parameter values: ¸2 = :2, and ± = :4.
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